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vABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the effect of Naval Reserve Medicine (NRM) policies and 
procedures on the recruitment of civilian physicians as Direct Commissioned Officers 
(DCO) and their affiliation as Career Transitioning Officers (CTO) in the Reserve 
Component (RC) of the Medical Corps (MC). NRM has a difficult time filling and 
maintaining MC Officers in the RC and the factors that cause such difficulty have never 
been studied. Organizational policies and procedures are analyzed to pinpoint 
congruency of the organization’s strategy in recruiting sufficient MC Officers in a 
constantly changing role and environment of the RC. A costs analysis is implemented to 
determine the role of pay and incentive in attracting physicians to sign up or affiliate in 
the reserves. It is also used to identify the competitiveness of military pay for 
physicians compared to the civilian counterpart. A DCO earns more by joining the 
military service compared to newly graduated physicians who elect to work in the 
civilian sector; therefore, the strategy should focus on recruiting DCOs. On the other 
hand, negative effects on the civilian and military pay gap are seen during the 
activation of MC Officers in the RC greater than a year for a total of three years and 
during deployment, which causes a negative appeal for civilian physicians to join the 
reserves. The outcome of the organizational model suggests that there is a need to re-
align organizational strategy and culture to enhance recruitment success within all 
levels. 
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The Department of the Navy (DON) provides operational support to the fleet by 
ensuring a sufficient number of medical professionals are always available in the Naval 
Reserve Medicine (NRM) community. NRM supports the fleet’s mission and combatant 
commander’s vision by having forces ready to respond during national crises. 
Furthermore the purpose of NRM is to provide a pool of trained and qualified medical 
professionals who can be mobilized anywhere in the world during contingency, 
humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and annual operational training evolutions 
critical to a warfighter’s success in the theater of operation.1 The traditional role of the 
mobilized Reserve Component (RC) occurs when an Active Component (AC) 
counterpart is deployed and the RC is required to replace the AC in their respective 
Medical Treatment Facility (MTF). But the changing role of the reserve is reflected on 
the occurrences of actual boots on ground deployments either at a fleet hospital with the 
Marines or onboard a hospital ship mission in a hazardous area.1  
Accessing and retaining highly trained and qualified medical personnel is a 
difficult task during high tempo deployments. NRM has a difficult time filling and 
maintaining Medical Corps (MC) officers. An in-depth examination of the cause of this 
problem is never examined. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery M1 (BUMED-M1) 
Total Force has a modeling tool for the AC which allows M1 to project their future 
manpower and personnel requirements. This tool enables them to establish the 
appropriate future mix of officers, recruiting requirements and personnel required for 
education and training pipelines to enable Navy Medicine to maintain specific 
requirements by growing and recruiting other professionals.2 Overall this tool makes it 
much easier to predict AC Navy Medicine Manpower requirements. It is built taking into 
account many variables and parameters. Unfortunately, at the time this tool was 
                                                 
1 Herbert L. Zick. “Changing Roles and Missions of the Medical Branch of the Naval Reserve during 
the Period 1987–1995” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1996). 
2 James Clearwood, email discussion with the author, October 2015. 
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developed, NRM was not considered. As a result, much of the analytics that go into 
determining manpower and personnel requirements for NRM are very one dimensional 
(i.e., loss rates and percentage of billets filled) by officer corps and subspecialties, and 
may lack an appropriate association with RC requirements. The Naval Reserve Medicine 
aims to identify the causes of recruiting difficulties and understand how AC requirements 
and past mobilization requirements affect this problem. Table 1 shows that Navy 
Medicine has the lowest percentage of RC Manpower to Total Force mix of any of the 
three Services (year 2005 is an exception). 
 Department of Defense Medical Manpower Requirement Table 1.  
Adapted from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness & Force 
Management, “Defense Manpower Requirements Report from FY05 to FY15,” 
December 2015, http://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/TFPRQ/docs/
F15%20DMRR.pdf. 
It is difficult to determine if NRM has the appropriate RC requirements to meet 
their total force needs as shown in Figure 1.3 A thorough study and understanding of the 
factors unknown to NRM may improve the accuracy of identifying future manpower 
requirements with a more systematic approach in order to predict actual manpower 
requirements. 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 




Navy 675 562 5 510 554 726 690 683 674 672 
Army 2273 2211 2012 1983 1862 1804 1914 1741 2366 2294 
Air 
Force 
627 1049 1037 978 893 1007 1351 1104 1162 1162 
DOD 3575 3822 3550 3471 3309 3362 3955 3528 4202 4128 
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Figure 1.  Medical Corps Officer Manpower Trend 2005–2015 
 
Adapted from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness & Force 
Management, “Defense Manpower Requirements Report from FY05 to FY15,” 
December 2015, http://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/TFPRQ/docs/
F15%20DMRR.pdf. 
This study examines the factors that affect the recruiting and affiliation difficulties 
at NRM. Various data is examined to identify those factors including a thorough study in 
the processes and policies that governs the RC, effects of the military and civilian pay gaps 
and organizational designs that may be identified to assist NRM in their day to day goals. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to identify and examine the factors affecting 
the difficulties in the recruitment and affiliation of Medical Corps Officers at NRM. This 
includes reviewing the civilian and military pay gap in the Medical Corps to identify the 
effects of the wage differential in the recruit decision to affiliate or join the military 
service. Organizational design of the NRM is analyzed in order to align the strategy 
required to increase and meet their goals. An organizational model is implemented to 
diagnose a need for transformational process to align organizational culture that aims to 
find the right person for the right job. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer the following primary questions: 
 What are the underlying causes of recruiting difficulties in the Navy RC in 
the Medical Corps?  
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 How does the civilian and military pay gap affect recruitment and 
affiliation of MC in the NRM? 
Secondary questions: 
 What organizational theories and designs can realign NRM personnel to 
establish a culture that will aid in achieving their goals? 
 How does adjusting Special Pay incentive affect affiliation? 
An organizational model allows NRM to re-evaluate the need for organizational 
transformation that aligns its structure and culture to address the changes in the role of 
reserves in the MC. Recruitment difficulties facing NRM are rooted in the need for 
organizational re-alignment stemmed from the ever changing roles of the MC in the RC. 
A change in processes and consideration of factors such as the economy and politics must 
always be monitored to ensure that the organization leverages its strategy in a timely 
manner. Cost analysis comparing pay among civilian and military shows a gap across 
different specialties. Along with the scenario based cost comparison, this disparity in pay 
causes negative appeal among potential recruit to join the military service. DCO as a 
source of applicants must be prioritized in terms of budget program allotment since the 
result of the cost analysis shows competitive return on investment compared to those who 
are newly practicing physicians in the civilian sector. The policies that govern pay and 
incentives for MC in the RC are not competitive and greatly contribute to the difficulties 
in recruitment of MC in the RC. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II includes information regarding the organizational background and 
literature reviews of previous studies related to the difficulties and retention of Medical 
Corps officers in the reserves. Chapter III discusses the organizational model used for the 
transformation process of NRM. Chapter IV is an explanation of the data to be used in 
the analysis and provide facts and figures in order to explain the factors that affect 
recruitment in the NRM RC through cost analysis. Chapter V reviews the detail of the 
cost analysis and presents the outcome of the study. Chapter VI includes the summary of 
the results, conclusion and recommendation needed for further study. 
5II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The history of the Navy Reserve Component (RC) can be best described as rich 
and ever changing. During the Cold War era, the RC was utilized as a manpower pool 
that is rarely used in any capacity. After World War II through the late 1980s, they were 
activated merely one time in each decade by the federal government.4 But afterwards, the 
RC’s changing role in the strength of the nation’s armed forces showed an increase in the 
tempo of deployments, and utilizations both in the traditional role and actual forward 
deployment in major conflicts. 
Navy RC physicians are primarily made up of civilians who aim to establish a 
career. The normal activity that the RC engages in the military involves annual trainings 
(AT), drill with a frequency of one time per month, and actual utilization to replace active 
duty around the globe. All RC personnel are assigned to one of the three major categories 
in the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve.5 
1. Ready Reserve
The Ready Reserve is the main source of manpower pool in the RC who is called 
to active duty before activating the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve for any 
major conflict around the globe when needed. There are other categories under the Ready 
Reserve such as the Selected Reserve (SELRES), Full Time Support (FTS), and the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). SELRES are those units who are highly trained and 
prioritized to deploy in support of any mission compared to the other sub category as 
shown in Table 2. IRR on the other hand are those personnel who are already trained but 
4 Herbert L. Zick. “Changing Roles and Missions of the Medical Branch of the Naval Reserve during 
the Period 1987–1995” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1996). 
5 Lawrence Kapp. Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answer (CRS Report No. 
RL30802). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL30802.pdf. 
6may be required to undergo additional training when needed. Some other units that fall 
under the IRR include the Voluntary Training Unit and the Active Status Pool. 
Table 2.   Medical Corps Officer and SELRES Inventory FY 2005–2012 




RC individuals in this category are commonly referred to as members who are in 
the Active Status List (ASL); personnel who established hardship, who incurred 
temporary disability and who possess key defense related positions in their civilian work. 
During full mobilization in support of major conflicts, RC personnel in this category can 
be involuntarily activated. There are also other category under the Standby Reserve 
including those who are in the inactive status list not be training for points and pay, and 
who are not eligible for promotion.6 
6 Ibid., 3–4 
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3. Retired Reserve 
Retired officers and enlisted personnel who served in the military as Active 
Component (AC) comprise majority of the Retired Reserve. Other personnel who are 
eligible in this category are those who transferred in to the Retired Reserve after 
qualifying for retirement, but before becoming eligible to receive retirement pay. RC 
personnel in this category can only be activated to mobilize when there is a recall for 
retirees.7 
B. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
1. Purpose of Reserve Component 
The significant role of Naval Reserve Medicine (NRM) in the military includes 
providing support to the mission and vision of Naval Medicine through integration, 
augmentation, sustainment, and medical readiness. In order to accomplish this, NRM 
must be able to effectively utilize their medical assets to assist the increase in tempo of 
medical deployments for various missions around the world. Therefore, some of the main 
missions of NRM are to ensure that recruitment goals are sustained depending on the 
trend of utilization of reserves. Retention of highly qualified medical professionals is 
continuously monitored in order to ensure the availability of qualified medical assets to 
support requirements in the military. 
2. Naval Reserve Medicine 
RC commands under the Budget Supporting Office 18 (BSO) includes seven 
Operational Health Support Units (OHSU) located at Bremerton, Jacksonville, Camp 
Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, Pensacola, Portsmouth, and San Diego (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 4 
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Figure 2.  Naval Medical Reserve Organization 
 
Adapted from Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, “Navy Medicine Strategic Plan FY-15,” 
March 2014. http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmpdc/courses/Documents/Forms/
AllItems.aspx. 
Other commands that are activated during major conflict in different areas of the 
world include three Expeditionary Medical Facilities (EMF’s) located in Dallas, 
Greatlakes, and Bethesda. The RC also has a command dedicated to training and 
education under the RC Naval Medical Education and Training Command (NMETC). 
Figure 3 shows the different NRM organizational region and work flow relationship 
between units. 
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Figure 3.  Naval Reserve Region 
 
Adapted from Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, “Navy Medicine Strategic Plan FY-15,” 
March 2014. http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmpdc/courses/Documents/Forms/
AllItems.aspx. 
3. Types of Naval Reserve Medicine Orders 
There are three types of RC orders that reservists may receive during their 
military careers categorized as training orders, extended active duty orders, and 
mobilization orders. 
a. Active Duty for Training  
The duration of such training is often flexible based on the type of mission 
support required for the evolution. Normal salary pay, per diem and travel pay are 
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authorized only if the Commander of the Naval Reserve Forces (CNRF) allocated 
specific budget for such a specialty.8  
b. Active Duty for Special Work  
This type of order is initiated through the request of an MTF, Regional 
Operational Support Office (OSO), BUMED and Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) with a 
maximum of three years activation. Availability of such support is based on allocated 
budget from the CNRF.9 
c. “265” Recall (U.S.C. Title 10, sec 12301(D)) 
This type of recall normally lasts two to three years in duration and is limited to 
the medical community billet for officers. Recalled personnel are for positions held at the 
staff headquarters and OSO.10 
d. Full Time Support Staff 
Full Time Support (FTS) staffs specifically for Navy Hospital Corpsman billets 
are detailed to a duty station with similar pay and benefits as their AC counterparts. 
Medical Officers in the RC community are not authorized for such a recall.11 
e. Inactive Duty Training  
Normal training composed of 48 paid drills per year, two day drills every month 
based on budget availability and per diem for travel may also be authorized. According to 
BUMED, “A compensation at the rate of one-thirtieth of the basic pay prescribed for 
grade and years of service for the performance of each authorized period.”12 
                                                 
8 Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, “Navy Medicine Strategic Plan FY-15,” March 2014. 
http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmpdc/courses/Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx. 





f. Annual Training  
BUMED validates the requirement for annual training before a member is 
identified; Figure 4 shows the flowchart for reserve AT. Typically 12 to 17 days of 
service specific training per year (up to 29 days, when funding is available) is required 
for MTF command support, on the job training (OJT), coursework, and other military 
exercise/mission support.13 
Figure 4.  Reserve Annual Training Sample Flowchart 
 
Adapted from Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, “Navy Medicine Strategic Plan FY-15,” 
March 2014. http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmpdc/courses/Documents/Forms/
AllItems.aspx. 
g. Additional Training Periods and Reserve Management Periods  
This category of reservists is supplemental to an IDT drill as needed but is highly 
dependent on budget availability from the CNRF.14 




h. Full Mobilization  
Activation of reservists in this category is reserved for major armed conflict or 
national emergency that may last greater than 6 months. There is no limit to the number 
of personnel activated and may include the Retired Reserve.15 
i. Partial Mobilization 
This type of mobilization involves involuntary activation of as many as one 
million Ready Reserve personnel for a period of 24 months. An example of such a call 
for activation was during the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict in the Middle East.16 
j. Presidential Reserve Call-up  
This type of mobilization of the RC personnel is normally initiated by the 
President who then notifies Congress within 24 hours of such determination. The number 
of involuntary activated reserves in this category may range to up to 200,000 Ready 
Reserves and may be activated for a period of 365 days or one year.17 
4. Special Pay for Reserve, Recalled or Retained Medical Corps Officer 
The entitlement for qualified Reserve Component Medical Corps officers is 
consistent with provisions contained in Title 37, United States Code (USC). They are 
eligible for Special Pay which includes Additional Special Pay (ASP), Incentive Special 
Pay (ISP), Board Certified Pay (BCP) and Variable Special Pay (VSP), on a pro-rata 
basis, based on the Fiscal Year Special Pay Plan in accordance with the Navy’s 
OPNAVINST 7220.17, when one of the following apply: 
 An RC Medical Corps officer is called to active duty, not for training 
includes those on initial active duty for training (IADT), annual training 
(AT), or additional duty training (ADT)), for a period of more than 30 
days, but less than 1 year.  
                                                 
15 Lawrence Kapp. Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answer (CRS Report No. 





 An RC Medical Corps officer who is involuntarily retained or recalled to 
active duty for a period of more than 30 days. 
 An officer who voluntarily agrees to remain on active duty for a period of 
not less than 1 year at a time provided that officers are involuntarily 
retained on active duty and ASD determines that special circumstances 
justify the payment of special pay.18 
A Medical Corps officer of the RC who is eligible for special pay must meet the 
same eligibility requirements as the Active Duty component. According to instructions, 
“The call or order and execution of a written agreement to remain on active duty must be 
for a period of not less than one year.”19 The method of payment differs subtly with the 
AC component. It also implies that all recalled reservists activated for at least one year 
are paid a lump sum for ASP and ISP and are paid monthly for VSP and BCP.20 ADSW 
reservists are paid monthly on a prorated amount for all special pays to include ASP, ISP, 
VSP, and BCP. The instruction also states, “For activation to active duty not equal to 30 
days a daily prorated amount is given.”21 
5. Accession Planning 
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Manpower, Personnel, 
Training and Education establishes an annual accession plan for the Navy RC in the 
Medical Corps which details factors including retention incentives and attainment of 
authorized strength in the specialty. BUMED states, “There must be sufficient accessions 
to support annual 5-year promotion plans for the inactive duty RC to ensure that the 
promotion opportunity and flow points that are necessary to meet authorized strength 
requirements are maintained.”22 The MC of the RC accession plan from FY11 to FY16 is 
shown in Table 3. 
                                                 
18 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. 2005. Special Pay for Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Medical 
Service Corps, and Nurse Corps Officers. OPNAVINST 7220.17. Washington, DC, December 2015 
http://www.med.navy.mil/bumed/Special_Pay/Documents/HomeLinks/References/
OPNAVINST%207220.17.pdf. 
19 Ibid., 65 
20 Ibid., 67 
21 Ibid. 
22 James Clearwood, email discussion with author. December 2015. 
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 Selective Reserve Medical Officer Accession Plan FY-2011-16 Table 3.  
SELRES Medical 
Corps 
FY‐11  FY‐12  FY‐13  FY‐14  FY‐15  FY‐16 
SSP  Specialty 
Name 
Goal  Max  Goal  Max  Goal  Max  Goal  Max  Goal  Max  Goal  Max 
15AO  Aviation 
Medicine 
3  6  3  5  7  14  12  28  12  23  12  12 
15A1  Aerospace 
Medicine 
1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
15B0  Anesthesia  21  43  25  38  20  30  25  33  25  30  20  30 















0  0  0  0  0  0  1  2  1  2  1  1 
15D  Neuro Surgery  1  2  1  2  0  0  4  6  1  3  1  3 
15E  OBGYN, General  2  2  1  2  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  1 
15F  General Medicine  23  45  19  25  27  46  24  30  0  7  5  10 
15G  Ophthalmology  0  0  1  2  2  3  0  0  0  1  0  3 
15HO  Orthopedic 
Surgeon 
16  26  20  38  22  35  28  28  27  32  24  25 
15I  Otolaryngology  0  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  1  3  1  3 
15J  Urology  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  2  1  2 
15KO  Preventive 
Medicine 
2  5  0  0  1  2  2  2  1  3  1  2 
16N  Dermatology  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0 
16P  Emergency 
Medicine 
14  20  9  15  7  9  7  7  8  22  2  3 
16Q  Family Medicine  9  12  12  15  8  14  4  4  8  21  8  11 
16R1  Internal Medicine  12  0  12  15  14  18  6  6  4  14  0  3 
16R1/
62C 
Critical Care  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  7  1  3 
16R1/
6RG 
Cardiology  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  6  1  4 
16R1/
6RP 
Infectious Disease  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  3  1  3 
16R1/
6RR 
Pulmonology  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  4  5  4  10 
16T  Neurology  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  2 
16U  Undersea 
Medicine 
0  0  0  0  1  1  0  2  0  2  0  0 
16V  Pediatrics  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  1 
16X  Psychiatry  8  12  7  10  5  8  2  5  1  2  1  2 
16Y  Diagnostic 
Radiologist 
2  4  1  1  0  2  0  3  0  1  0  2 
  TOTAL  140  160  142  220  140  225  165  288  140  243  125  188 
Adapted from James Clearwood, email discussion with author. December 2015. 
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The determination of accession programs used to attain and maintain specialty 
authorizations is based on the current and projected supply and demand of officers in the 
MC.23 The use of the most effective program is often maximized. NRM argues, “The 
relative cost, time and continuation rate to reach the desired number of RC Medical 
Corps officers are compared and used as the factors in determining which program to 
use.”24 Also, in order to adjust to the changes in the civilian market and in the MC 
requirements, flexible plans are often developed as a back-up. Similar to the AC, a 
reasonable career progression opportunity for the authorized strength of entry-level 
applicants are to be maintained.  
The Office of the Medical Corps Chief makes an annual recommendation in terms 
of accession planning. The Reserve Affairs Officer (RAO) for the MC Chief reviews 
current policy and program authorization summaries addressing corps specific 
requirements. NRM suggests,  
Major factors, such as fiscal year RC Wartime Health Care Specialties 
with Critical Shortages, as identified by the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, are a priority in the determination of accession planning. Other 
accession training programs such as Training for Medical Specialties 
(TMS) Flexible Reserve Drill Option with Navy Personnel Command 
(NPC) Medical Accessions Programs (N-314) are also considered as a 
basis in determining which accession programs are to be used.25  
According to NRM, the RAO also reviews proposed specialty pay, bonus 
guidance, and promotion planning with the Medical Officer Community Manager 
(BUPERS-318M) for the upcoming year. Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) uses a three 
and five year history for projected gain and loss rates and recruiting goal performance to 
set new accession goals for evolving community demands. Gain and loss history is also 
reviewed with BUMED M-10. Once data reviews are complete, recommendations are 
forwarded to the RC Medical Corps Chief for review and approval. Final 





to the Medical Officer Community Manager (OCM) at PERS 318M.26 Figure 5 shows 
the accession planning flowchart utilized at NRM. 
Figure 5.  Flowchart Accession Planning 
Adapted from James Clearwood, email discussion with author, December 2015. 
C. CIVILIAN PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
In order to fully understand the difficulties faced by NRM in the recruiting of 
physicians for the RC Medical Corps, a comprehensive understanding of the supply and 
demand of civilian physician must be studied. According to projections from the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the rapid increase in demand for physicians 
and healthcare workers that began in 2012 will continue as baby boomers approach age 
26 Ibid. 
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65 (see Figure 6). The same study projects a severe gap between supply and demand as 
the aging population grows from 10% in 2010 to almost 50% in 2020.27 
Figure 6.  Population Growth 2000 to 2020 
 
Adapted from the United States Department of Health and Human Services. “Physician 
Supply and Demand: Projections to 2020.” February 1, 2016, http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/
healthworkforce/supplydemand/medicine/physician2020projections.pdf. 
1. Factors Affecting Physician Supply 
The physician supply model estimates the number of medical providers in various 
specialties by considering the number of physicians that are currently active, new ones 
from medical schools and attrition due to retirement, death and disability. Department of 
Health and Human Services states, “Physician workforce that is currently available is 
estimated by size and characteristics. Physician demographics such as age and gender 
play a major role in determining the supply trends by calculating their retirement thus 
                                                 
27 United States Department of Health and Human Services. “Physician Supply and Demand: 
Projections to 2020.”Accessed February 1, 2016, http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/supplydemand/ 
medicine/physician2020projections.pdf. 
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shifting the distribution.”28 Therefore, the factors affecting physician supply can be 
divided into three main categories: demographics, new entrants and economic growth. 
a. Demographics 
The age and gender distribution of the physician workforce is affected by a trend 
of phenomenal changes as we enter the 21st century. Males dominated the medical 
industry early in the century, which caused the number of physicians approaching 
retirement age to be of that gender. Almost 7 out of 8 physicians over the age of 55 are 
male. Female dominance occurred approximately 3 decades ago due to the increase of 
female graduates from 10 to 50%.29 According to Department of Health and Human 
Services, “Because work and retirement patterns differ systematically for male and 
female physicians, the increasing proportion of physicians who are female has profound 
implications for the overall supply of physician services.”30 The age distribution of 
physicians under the age of 75 is illustrated in Figure 7. 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 4–5 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 5 
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Figure 7.  Percent of Physician Active in the Workforce 
 
Adapted from the United States Department of Health and Human Services. “Physician 
Supply and Demand: Projections to 2020.” February 1, 2016, http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/
healthworkforce/supplydemand/medicine/physician2020projections.pdf. 
b. New Entrants 
The availability of physicians to sustain the demands of the future is highly 
dependent on the number of new entrants. Figure 8 depicts the constant increase in the 
output of medical schools in the country for the past 15 years. According to USDHSS, 
Almost 24,000 physicians complete their training through programs of 
graduate medical education (GME) each year. Before completing 
residencies and fellowships, new physicians must earn a four-year college 
degree and complete four years of medical education. Four out of five 
physicians completing GME are graduates of United States medical schools. 
Most are graduates of schools of allopathic medicine, which annually 
graduate approximately 15,000 to 16,000 MDs. This number has been 
relatively stable since 1980, and the baseline projections assume that the 
U.S. will continue to graduate approximately 16,000 MDs per year through 
2020. Schools of osteopathic medicine graduate approximately 3,000 DOs 
per year, and the baseline supply projections assume that this number will 
steadily increase to approximately 4,000 per year over the next decade.31  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 6 
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Figure 8.  Increased Output from U.S. Medical Schools 
 
Adapted from the United States Department of Health and Human Services. “Physician 
Supply and Demand: Projections to 2020.” February 1, 2016, http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/
healthworkforce/supplydemand/medicine/physician2020projections.pdf. 
c. Economic Growth 
One of the major determinants of the adequacy of physician supply is based on 
economic growth. The theory suggests that as the economy grows the demand for 
physician services increases therefore physician salaries increases.32 Healthcare as a 
normal good is consumed by individuals at a higher rate as their income rises, therefore, 
as economic growth tends to improve people’s income, then we would expect demand for 
medical services to increase. This is also true when the ability to pay deductibles and 
copays becomes affordable then an expected higher consumption of such good is the 
result.33 
                                                 
32 James Avantes, “Demand for Family Physician Fuels Salary, Compensation Increases, Study 
Finds,” July 9, 2013, http://www.aafp.org/news/practice-professional-issues/
20130709mgmacompensation.html. 
33 Richard Cooper, Thomas Getzen, Heather Mckee, and Prakash Laud. “Economic and Demographic 
Trends Signal an Impending Physician Shortage,” Health Affairs (2002). Doi:10.1377/hlthaff.21.1.140. 
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2. Physician Supply and Demand Projections  
Although the strategy to improve policies, programs and government funding to 
support medical schools in the late 1950s and 1960s aimed to alleviate the potential 
shortage in the medical field.34 The study conducted by the Department of Health and 
Human Services suggests that there is still a need to increase the capacity of the medical 
schools in order to support the aging populations need for medical care. The surge in the 
demand requires a modest increase in the supply through the next two decades. Although, 
based on their calculation future needs have sufficient supply in terms of physician but 
the analysis of Uwe Reinhardt suggests 
[It is a] daunting enterprise . . . to estimate the physician surplus or 
shortage one or two decades into the future. Any of the variables in the 
equation can change over time, sometimes in unforeseen ways.35 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews prior research to examine recruiting and retention factors in 
the Medical Corps, Chaplain Corps, and Nurse Corps. Since there is no research 
conducted specifically to the Medical Corps RC in terms of those issues, the findings on 
the prior research for AC is used as a guide and basis in determining the difficulties in 
recruiting and retention for the RC in the NRM specifically in the Medical Corps. 
1. Retention Elasticity and Projection Model for U.S. Navy Medical 
Corps Officers 
The 2013 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis written by Alshehri and 
Brossard is a thorough study of the factors that affects U.S. Navy Medical Corps 
retention in service. The thesis analyzes the effects of civilian and military pay gap, 
lifestyle, military benefits and deployment to predict retention in the 19 specialties 
between the years of FY2002 and FY2011. Military retention is defined as the likelihood 
of the personnel to stay in the military after the initial obligation. 
                                                 
34 Department of Health and Human Services. Summary Report of the Graduate Medical Education 
National Advisory Committee. (HRA-81-651). Washington, DC: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1980. 
35 Reinhardt, Uwe.E. ( 2002). Analyzing cause and effect in the United States physician workforce. 
Health Affairs, pg 165. https://council.brandeis.edu/pdfs/2007/Reinhardt1-AnalyzingCause.pdf. 
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The sources of data for this study are BUMED, Defense Financial and 
Accounting System (DFAS) and Medical Group Management Association (MGMA). The 
final sample for cohorts FY2002 through FY2011 consisted of 4,960 observations of non-
stayers and 3,326 of stayers in the military as shown in Table 4. 
 Number of Unobligated Providers at a Decision Point Table 4.  
Fiscal Year 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
N= 634 642 726 633 534 475 377 331 324 284 4960 
Stayers= 453 484 563 449 329 303 207 200 174 164 3326 
Adapted from Abdullah Alsheri and Hyrum Brossard. “Retention Elasticity and 
Projection Model for U.S. Navy Medical Corps Officers” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2013). 
The thesis also incorporates other variables in the probit regression model to 
analyze the trend and study the retention issues. Some of the variables that are used 
include gender, race, rank, accession sources, age and years of service. The finding of the 
study shows the effect of the civilian and military pay gap which negatively impacts the 
retention of Medical Corps in the U.S. Navy. As the gap of the physician’s income 
widens, the ability to retain specialized doctors becomes very difficult especially if the 
skill is in demand in the civilian sector. The underlying figure in the pay gap of $98,787 
is a major factor in retaining only 67% of Medical Corps officers. Also, based on the 
analysis, accession through USUHS tends to have a higher probability of staying in 
service compared to other accession sources. In terms of deployment in support of the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) effects on retention, the study also finds that the 
probability of staying in the military decreased by 14.1 percentage points because of this 
factor. 
The approach of the study that is conducted on active duty Medical Corps officers 
is timely as the war on terrorism escalated in the early and mid-2000 which perfectly 
shows the retention effects of the protracted war on retention. This is also a great time to 
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analyze the impact of the 2008 economic difficulties which seemed to have not affected 
the retention in the military for the specialty used for the thesis. Overall, the research 
found statistical evidence that the civilian and military pay gap and deployment has a 
negative impact on the retention of Navy doctors. Alshehri and Brossard recommended 
that 
As the civilian pay gap increases, it becomes more difficult to retain 
doctors in the Navy when their skills are easily transferrable in to the 
civilian sector. As a result, the Navy will potentially always have issues 
retaining its medical providers.36 
2. U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps Recruiting: Ideas to Boost Deficiencies 
with Recruiting and Accessing of Chaplains 
McGuffin’s 2008 study of Chaplains in the U.S. Navy analyzes the need for 
incentives reform to boost recruitment in their field. He uses survey data to study the 
behavior and pattern instrumental in determining the efficiency of current programs. The 
incentive discussed in the study for the U.S. Navy includes only a single bonus incentive 
for those AC to transfer to RC. Other incentives which are similar to those for AC 
include guaranteed assignment, tuition assistance (TA), matching TA, loan repayment, 
scholarships and accession bonus.  
The data collected from the survey indicated a need to boost incentives as 
recruitment lags behind the yearly goals. In order to expand the market of candidates, 
recruiting bonuses must be increased to enable recruiters to possess a tool to attract 
candidates. The loan repayment program which is already in place has a low impact on 
recruitment since only 61.5% of new Chaplains had educational loans when they were 
recruited and the remaining 33% of recruits does not have loans. Additional low cost 
incentive such as the guaranteed first assignment has substantial effect on recruitment but 
is not available for the Chaplain Corps. The data show that such an incentive may prove 
to have a large scale effect since 89% of seminarians suggested that availability of such 
an incentive has a greater value. Other incentive that yields a high outcome includes 
buddy assignments, hometown recruiting incentive, Chaplain recruiter incentive and 
                                                 
36 Abdullah Alsheri and Hyrum Brossard. “Retention Elasticity and Projection Model for U.S. Navy 
Medical Corps Officers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).  
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restructuring of accession plan. Overall the importance of determining what factors entice 
recruits to join becomes very valuable. In order to obtain such information a thorough 
understanding of the markets preferences must be collected, as McGuffin argued 
The three surveys conducted by the researcher provided insight into the 
thinking of the seminarians, junior Chaplains and senior chaplains. These 
insights suggests where the Chaplain Corps presently finds itself and a few 
possible direction it may go to improve recruiting.37 
3. Analysis of the Retention and Affiliation Factors Affecting the Active 
and Reserve Naval Nurse Corps 
Pizanti analyzes the factors affecting the retention of Naval Nurse Corps (NNC) 
officer in the active and Reserve Component of the Navy. The study focuses on 
understanding the organizational factors and demographic effects on retention as well as 
the changes needed to be made to organizational design to ease the issue of manning 
shortages. It also looked at the affiliation of NNC in the reserves, how demographic and 
organizational factors affect the decision of nurses in the military to continue their service 
in the reserves. 
The factors for the Active duty military include demographic characteristics of the 
NNC such as gender, race, family background and age. Other factor in the category 
includes deployment tempo and accession sources. On the other hand, the factors 
affecting reserve affiliation is compose of comparing enlisted and officer affiliation, 
characteristics of reserve job both in the military and civilian setting, family support and 
mobilization. Pizanti’s analysis examines the factors affecting retention using logit 
regressions for both the active and reserve military.  
The result of the study for the Active Component shows that males, having 
children regardless of marital status, prior enlisted, older age, black, minorities and 
postgraduate degree holders are more likely to stay in the service. Accession through the 
Medical Enlisted Commissioning program (MECP) yields a positive significant result in 
predicting retention possibilities which is higher than the other sources. The reserve 
                                                 
37 Frederick McGuffin. “U.S. Navy Chaplain Corps Recruiting: Ideas to Boost Deficiencies with 
Recruiting and Assessing of Chaplains” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
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affiliation model yields a totally different result in terms of demographics and other 
variables. Gender, race, schooling and training in large hospitals is not significant, 
therefore there is no difference in the behavior or decision of affiliation with these 
factors. The factors that are a positive indicator for affiliation to the reserves for the NNC 
includes commissioning age, accession source and prior enlistment, which concludes that 
personnel who tends to value retirement due to being older and prior enlisted with a 
commissioning source from other gain categories tend to affiliate at a higher rate. The 
finding from the thesis is able to support studies conducted in the past. The factors that 
positively affect retention and affiliation for both the active and reserve component is 
able to provide an insight on how goals and numbers must be concentrated on specific 
significant factors. This may lead to the determination of accession sources that may 
yield greater retention rates. Bonuses and recruiting efforts may be aligned on specific 
factors that may help manpower analysts formulate a more reliable forecast on how many 
personnel can be targeted at a higher possibility of recruiting success. 
4. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Navy Medical Corps Accession 
Programs 
Schmidt and Colvin’s 2012 thesis evaluates the effectiveness of Navy MC 
accession programs by comparing the retention rates of MC Officers coming from the 
different accession sources such as Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP), 
University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), Navy Active Duty Delayed Specialists 
(NADDS) and Direct Accessions (DA). It aims to understand the retention rates for the 
different sources of MC Officers in the United States Navy, whether it can supplement 
adequate long term manpower supply for the specialty. Aside from the determination of 
retention rates, it also studies the optimal mix of manpower personnel from different 
accession sources to fill billet requirements in the future.  
The factors that are analyzed in the study includes the accession sources and 
demographic information such as gender, education level, marital status, prior service 
status, recruitment states and race. The data originates from Navy Recruiting Command 
(NRC) and BUMED, Table 5 shows the breakdown of the number of observation in both 
the retained and not retained category. 
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 Dependent Variable Characteristics Retention Status  Table 5.  
RETENTION STATUS NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
PERCENTAGE 
RETAINED ONE YEAR 2535 65.61 
NOT RETAINED ONE YEAR 1329 34.39 
Adapted from Juli Schmidt and Colvin Walter. “Evaluating the Effectiveness of the 
Medical Corps Accession Programs” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
Explanatory variables include accession year, program of entry and 
demographics. The authors utilize a probit model for different categories to explain the 
effects of race and gender. In terms of forecasting future end strengths a Markov model is 
used containing data totaling 11,790 observations from cohorts since FY 81 through FY 
2010. 
The active duty result for the regression in the study concludes that those MC 
Officers from USUHS and other category such as DA and recalls are more likely to stay 
in the military after their original service obligation at a rate of 28%. Interestingly, prior 
enlisted personnel who became MC Officers are less likely to stay which is contradictory 
to the assumption that they are more likely to stay based on the number of years in 
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Adapted from Juli Schmidt and Colvin Walter. “Evaluating the Effectiveness of the 
Medical Corps Accession Programs” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
The race model which compared HPSP and USUHS sources revealed that blacks 
are more likely to stay compared to Asians and other races. The gender model showed 
that males are 15% more likely to stay in the military compared to females in the Medical 
Corps. Reserve component regression results yielded inconclusive outcomes in this 
particular study due to insufficient data. 
E. CONCLUSION 
All the prior studies show that trends and factors affecting retention are important 
to identify in both healthcare and non-healthcare settings. The identification of these 
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factors that causes one to stay or leave the military service affects new policy, ensures 
adequate manpower recruitment and justifies expected return on investment for money 
spent on training and accession efforts. General themes across the literatures showed that 
pay, incentives, certain demographic characteristics, quality of life, and accession sources 
are all significant factors. The active duty studies for officers in other specialties have had 
findings that can also represent a similarity to the RC in the Medical Corps. The RC 
Medical Corps, in its entirety, has not been the subject of a quantitative retention study, 
and no study has analyzed the factors and trends that contribute to the difficulty in 
recruitment and retention. Considering the complexity of the MC in the RC and the 
investment needed to ensure proper MC end strength, it is important to have current 










III. ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL AND CULTURE 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter aims to analyze the organizational culture and structure of NRM 
using a widely known theoretical model to explain alternative solutions affecting 
recruitment of MC in the reserves. Since the NRM purpose is to ensure adequate medical 
support for various missions and operations around the globe, a roadmap for 
understanding organizational performance is critical to its success.38 The difficulty in the 
recruitment of military physicians in the RC can be diagnosed using the organizational 
transformational model that can either improve or change its processes. This section uses 
the congruence model to perform such diagnosis and help improve the organizations’ 
ability to ease recruitment for that specialty. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL 
Resistance to change is the downfall of major organizational changes in the past 
decades. As a result, various organizational models which include the Congruence 
Model, Six Box Organizational Model, Art of Japanese Management, Organizational 
dynamics, and Levitt Model are used by businesses to evaluate organizational design and 
effectiveness when an organizational transformation is needed.39 These models are used 
to diagnose organizational effectiveness to further improve their output and performance. 
Academic research and practical applications were performed using these models in a 
vast number of major companies. The approach to incorporate naturally occurring 
systems and human organizations started when Harvard Business School noticed a 
connection from environment input and other factors to produce internal transformation 
                                                 
38 Nadler, David, Michael Tushman, and Nina Hatvany. “Managing Organizations,” in Organizational 
Dynamics, (New York: Columbia University Medical Center, 1980), 35–47.  
39 Frank Barrett. “Leading Organizational Change” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, May 2015) 
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of processes.40 In this chapter the use of the Congruence Model is outlined to aid NRM in 
improving their performance using organizational theory. 
1. Congruence Model 
The failure of an organizations’ ability to change and react to its environment 
both internally and externally can cause numerous problems. According to Nadler and 
Tushman, the primary job of the management in every organization is to ensure effective 
operation and understanding of the behavior that influences that environment is often 
difficult to identify.41 This is true and is reflected in the notion of organizational culture 
as one compares the analogy to an iceberg. The culture of an organization that is visible 
to an individual does not show the vast values and beliefs hidden under water. This model 
stresses the different aspects that are considered factors in the diagnosis of organization 
to identify such issues. Consider the work of Peter Senge in the book The Fifth 
Discipline. He acknowledges that reductionism or breaking up a whole into different 
components is flawed, therefore, understanding that the sum of the components is greater 
than just looking at the parts.42  
The congruence model outlines relevant factors associated with input, 
environment, resources, history, strategy, work, formal and informal organization, 
people, output, system, unit and the individual in the perspective of NRM as depicted in 
Figure 9. Understanding and using the tool in a systematic way can identify elements that 
drive or hinder organizational performance. Analyzing all the factors separately at NRM 
can improve compatibility within the organizations culture and people. The higher the 
congruence the better the fit within the organization’s culture and people resulting in a 
                                                 
40 “Congruence Model, A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational Performance,” Mercer Delta, 
LLC., January 2016, http://ldt.stanford.edu/~gwarman/Files/Congruence_Model.pdf. 
41 Nadler, David, Michael Tushman, and Nina Hatvany. “Managing Organizations,” in Organizational 
Dynamics (New York: Columbia University Medical Center, 1980), 36. 
42 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline. The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: 
Doubleday/Currency, 1990), 13. 
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better performance. Similarly when the pieces of the elements are not aligned, the friction 
has a negative impact on the organizational process which can hinder productivity.43 
Figure 9.  Congruence Model 
 
Adapted from “Congruence Model, A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational 
Performance,” Mercer Delta, LLC, January 2016, http://ldt.stanford.edu/~gwarman/Files/
Congruence_Model.pdf. 
a. Inputs 
The internal and external factors that the organization has to work with such as 
environment, resources, and history make up the inputs that the model need for the 
analysis of the problem.44  
                                                 
43 “The Congruence Model: Aligning the Drivers of High Performance,” Mind Tools, March 2016, 
https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newSTR_95.htm. 
44 Nadler, David, Michael Tushman, and Nina Hatvany. “Managing Organizations,” in Organizational 
Dynamics (New York: Columbia University Medical Center, 1980), 38. 
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(1) Environment 
Trends in economics, politics, technology, and society greatly impact an 
organization. These factors often create demands and constraints needed in the analysis 
of the problem. NRM must identify environmental factors that may affect their ability to 
recruit physicians constantly. Some factors that may affect such recruitment efforts may 
include employment rates, physician supply due to forecasted aging population, 
technological advancements and election cycles to name a few. If the NRM recognizes 
low employment rates, policy changes on bonus and incentive amounts must be 
scrutinized to compete with the civilian sector. The supply of physicians as the 
population becomes older may require recruitment in the medical schools as a focus of 
effort. By anticipating trends that affect the problem or issue, certain actions may be done 
to avoid difficulties in attaining required physicians to support military missions and 
operations. Understanding the environmental elements that affect the organization can 
then provide opportunities for strategy change. 
(2) Resources 
The second source of input for the analysis of a problem includes the 
organizations’ full range of asset, capital and information that can be used to identify 
such issues. The contribution of people or employees is oftentimes underestimated as 
processes and increase in tempo at work persist. This creates morale and motivation 
issues in the long run but by understanding that people are the number one asset can often 
mitigate such an issue. Another resource that must be improved and maintained at NRM 
involves networking. The value of having a wide array of professional networks cannot 
be overlooked. Keeping the image likeable for those who work or worked in any capacity 
can go a long way since they serve as spokespersons for those potential recruits. 
(3) History 
An organization that supports a great mission and vision does not evolve over 
night. Strategic decisions, key leaders, and crisis managers, are some of the historical 
factors that helped shape the values and beliefs of an organization. NRM’s mission has 
evolved over the years and its ability to keep up with the requirements of Navy Medicine 
 33
suggests that it has a successful history. Time has shown that as the role of reservist 
changes from stand by support, active duty replacement and forward deployed assets are 
a fruit of years of great leadership and strategy management. Understanding this type of 
input is a must in order to reasonably predict an organization’s capacity today and 
especially in the future. As the organization transform in response to the ever changing 
roles of the reserve, means that strategical changes must be expected in the future. 
b. Strategy 
Identification of the factors that compose a current situation is important but the 
strategy to address such trends weighs even more. The nature of the work and the 
processes are all outputs from the strategy formulated by the organization. Strategy then 
becomes critical and may be the most important factor that must be established to 
successfully direct an organizations’ goal and mission towards success. Military entities 
such as NRM can be perceived as a well-structured organization whose processes and 
procedures are aligned and systematic. Often standard operating procedures dictate the 
way a department operates in a daily basis but knowing that a strategy that changes as the 
factors identified changes is needed to ensure decisions and goals are achieved. 
c. Work 
The basic and inherent job to be performed by the organization is the best 
description for work.45 The value of understanding work is critical since this is the bread 
and butter of every organization. Work flows, patterns, skills, rewards and stress are 
some of the most scrutinized components of work. Synergy must always be present and 
equipping all levels of workers with the best tool often dictates success and failures. The 
traditional structure of work in an organization such as NRM involves echelons or 
hierarchies that often communicate through the leadership at each level. Changing the 
structure may lead through a different outcome such as direct communication inter-level 
that may speed up processes. 
                                                 
45 Wikipedia, s.v. “Work,” last modified February 2016. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Work. 
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d. People 
NRM as a huge organization ranging from top leaders at the headquarters to the 
recruiters at each NOSC and they all must be aligned to a common goal. Critical elements 
needed by recruiters in meeting their quotas must always be looked at in deeper 
perspective. This enables them to perform their jobs at a higher level reaping greater 
numbers and achieving well above their goals. Leaders also must always address types of 
knowledge and skills required at different jobs. They must also understand their peoples’ 
needs such as rewards and incentives. Gauging the knowledge of the workers perception 
and expectations with the organization is also a must. In the age of analytics, NRM must 
have the capability to pinpoint trends in demographics and rate of productivity in order to 
leverage on strong points and address the weak ones. 
e. Formal Organization 
The organizations’ formal structure is made up of the systems and processes 
designed for each work and its people in order to achieve its mission and goals.46 NRM 
as required by the DCNO to establish an annual accession plan for the RC, identify 
retention incentives and maximize use of different recruitment program is structured to 
attain end strength objectives for different medical specialties. The key element that 
affects the formal organization is its ability to transform based on the different inputs 
associated with the external and internal factors. Consideration of the elements that make 
up the formal organization such as the way jobs are grouped together, job design and 
work environment must be able to transform as the change is needed. 
f. Informal Organization 
The difference between the formal and informal organization is that the first is 
structured and most of the time written while the latter is not. Influence that affects the 
individual or groups behavior makes up the informal organization. In order to ease the 
difficulty associated with recruitment for medical specialties, NRM must identify the 
relevance of the informal characteristics to the realities of the current work 
                                                 
46 “Congruence Model, A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational Performance,” Mercer Delta, 
LLC. January 2016, http://ldt.stanford.edu/~gwarman/Files/Congruence_Model.pdf. 
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environment.47 Some items that need to be considered include patterns of processes, 
practices, and political relationships that evolved as a result of the values and beliefs of 
the individuals who work in the organization. 
2. The Concept of Fit 
Understanding that outputs in any organization that are measured by its 
attainment of goals is secondary to this model. NRM always have the responsibility to 
achieve end strength as dictated by the need and requirement of ongoing Navy Medicine 
missions and operations. The application of the congruence model for this purpose 
exceeds that expectation since it is the blueprint for a transformation process as shown in 
Figure 10. Ultimately, the reason why an organization such as NRM exists is to provide 
output as required by a higher echelon requirement. If the model is applied and used 
correctly, the concept of fit then provides more than what is expected. The alignment of 
such components such as work, people, structure, and culture then produces a tighter fit 
on the solidarity in the performance of the entire organization which only results in the 
achievement of desired goals and expectations. 
                                                 
47 Ibid.,7 
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Figure 10.  Transformation Process 
 
Adapted from “Congruence Model, A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational 
Performance,” Mercer Delta, LLC. January 2016, http://ldt.stanford.edu/~gwarman/Files/
Congruence_Model.pdf. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Organizational culture can be defined as “a system of shared assumptions, values, 
and beliefs, which governs how people behave in organizations. These shared values 
have a strong influence on the people in the organization and dictate how they dress, act, 
and perform their jobs.”48 A strong organizational culture can thwart possibilities of 
complacency that may contribute to the organizations’ inability to achieve its goals. 
According to Peter Senge, when people in an organization focus only on their position 
they have little responsibility for the result produced when all the position interact. And 
when the results are disappointing it can be very difficult to know why and just assume 
                                                 
48 Wikipedia s.v. “Organizational Culture,” last modified January 2016. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
OrganizationalCulture. 
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that somebody out there did not perform well. This can be avoided when the culture of 
the organization is optimistic, evolving and not resistant to failures.49 
1. Right Person for the Right Job 
This type of culture can be often perceived as the ideal for a military setting. But 
having this type of mind set often leads to a more lasting relationship within the 
organization and a better work environment. Many costly recruitments and waste of 
training dollars was a result of not finding the right person for the right job. More often 
filling positions and recruitment of potential personnel are accomplished based on the 
assumption that quotas have to be met and numbers have to be reported. But if the culture 
of the organization is shifted to the notion of finding the right person for the right job 
such waste can be avoided. Also, the quality of performance output and the quality of life 
within the organization can be naturally improved by having this mind set. 
2. Attraction Selection Attrition (ASA) Model 
The changing and strengthening of organizational culture can be achieved by 
having proactive leaders, culturally aligned goals and rewards, and values formation of 
service for country. ASA model as a theory holds that individuals are attracted to 
organizations whose members are similar to themselves in terms of values, interests and 
attributes can aid in the consolidation of organizational culture as shown in Figure 11.50  
                                                 
49 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline. The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: 
Doubleday/Currency, 1990), 18. 
50 Oxford s.v. “ASA Model.” Last modified February 2016. http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/
10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095433929. 
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Figure 11.  ASA Model 
 
Adapted from Marco DiRenzo. “Organizational Culture” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, June 2014.) 
D. SUMMARY 
NRM as an organization that supports the Navy as a whole must ensure that the 
organizational structure and culture of its people is aligned to the mission and vision of 
the military and Navy Medicine. The unique composition of recruits specifically the MC 
can pose a problem in recruitment because of the competitive market of physicians 
especially in the aspect of compensation. Establishing an organization whose culture 
reflects service to country, sacrifice, and quality of life, can aid in attracting the right 
people and have investment that serves a purpose rather than a liability. There are 
numerous organizational models that can be used to ensure that transformation when 
needed can be achieved. Understanding the factors that influence the internal and external 
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environment of an organization proves to be a vital component in this transformation 
process. Most of the failures that occur in any organization are contributed by resistance 
to change. It is indeed very easy to go through the motion of performing under the same 
policy and procedure for a long time and assume that the processes are still applicable. 
Timely determination that there is a need to transform based on factors that could be 
easily diagnosed using management tools such as the congruent model can improve the 
performance of an organization in the long run.  
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
A. DATA SOURCE 
The data used for this study were collected and constructed by the NRM at the 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED). NRM is a division of the BUMED 
Manpower Department that handles the MC in the RC. They provided MC data for all 
RC from FY 2007 to FY 2015 in Excel file format. The pay information for the military 
physicians is collected from DFAS and the pay information for the civilian physicians 
across the country was collected from the Merritt Hawkins report. 
1. DFAS 
In order to manually create a military pay database the base pay and basic 
subsistence allowance was collected from the DFAS website from FY2010 through 
FY2015. A database for pay grades O-3 through O-6, from 4 years of service to 20 years 
and above was created to represent the military pay for MC in the RC. Not included in 
the database that was created are those ranks from O-1 to O-2 and O-7 above due to the 
lower rank obligation status and executive medicine functions for the higher rank. In 
order to represent comparable military pay, inputs for basic housing allowance (BAH) 
was included from historical data at the Defense Travel website (Defense Travel 
Management Office, 2015). Also included in the military pay for MC in the RC are the 
special pays allotted to them when activated namely ISP, BCP, ASP and VSP. Appendix 
A gives a breakdown of what the ISP and MSP are for each specialty by FY. 
2. Civilian Pay File 
The civilian physician compensation data for FY2010 through FY2014 was 
obtained from Merritt Hawkins and AMN Healthcare’s sister physician companies 
namely Kendal and Davis and Staff Care.51 Merritt Hawkins is a national healthcare 
search and consulting firm specializing in the recruitment of physicians in all medical 
                                                 




specialties and other advanced practice clinicians. They are one of the nation’s largest 
healthcare staffing organizations and the industry innovator of healthcare workforce 
solutions. Annual Salary Surveys for FY2009 through FY2014 were conducted by the 
company in order to obtain physician pay data. They reviewed 3,148 yearly surveys to 
obtain physician salary for the various medical specialties and aggregated the responses 
to create a low, average and high salary pay for each specialty in the civilian sector. The 
civilian compensation total represents the physician’s gross income, before taxes. 
3. BUMED 
The BUMED data consisted of all MC Officers in the RC who served from 2007 
to 2015, which only included the designation of 2105. Navy military physicians serving 
in the RC are the holder of the 2105 designation. They are further broken down into 
different subspecialty that makes up the MC. It also contains general demographics, pay 
entry base date, accession source, medical specialty, state, rank, marital status, and age. 
Two types of data that included important information are provided for manpower and 
personnel. The manpower data consisted of information that are focused on the available 
billet that NRM currently have for RC in each FY. On the other hand, the personnel data 
is composed of specific billets that are currently filled by NRM. Both, however, contain 
similar data needed to analyze trends and factors using different techniques. The dataset 
for our sample is made up of approximately 7,000 observations between FY 2007 to FY 
2015. In order to eliminate blank data on some entries due to transfer of personnel, the 
total sample size was reduced to 2,767 due to the elimination of such incomplete data 
entry and duplicate information per FY. 
Table 7 shows the general descriptive statistics of MC within the RC from FY07 





 Characteristics of Medical Corps Officers in the Reserve Table 7.  
Component from FY07 to FY15 
Characteristics Reserve Component 
N=2,767 
Accession Sources:  
Direct Commission Officer (DCO) 75.8% 













40 Y/O and below 4.2% 
41 to 59 Y/O 68% 







Most of the MC in the RC in the data provided by BUMED are from the Direct 
Commissioning Program (DCO) (75.8%), male (87.5%), married (80.6%), holding the 
rank of CDR (43.4%), between the age of 41 and 59 (68%) and mostly recruited in the 
Southern region (33.6%). 
B. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
In order to conduct a comprehensive military and civilian physician pay analysis, 
a database was created to show numerous pay information derived from DFAS and the 
Merritt Hawkins report in 2014. The military pay database for MC in the RC includes 
base pay and basic subsistence allowance (BAS) from fiscal year 2010 to 2016. The 
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database created was composed of O-3 through O-6, from 3 years to 20 years of service. 
Since O-1’s and O-2’s are still in obligated status they were not included in the analysis. 
Other factors included in the military salary are BAH, bonuses, hazard pay, family 
separation allowance and hostile fire pay. MC in the RC is entitled to many types of 
Special Pay as outlined in OPNAVINST 7220.17. In order to compensate for the 
deficiency in the military pay for the physicians in certain specialties, the ISP, BCP, ASP 
and VSP are added to their total pay in a prorated system if activation is under 1 year, and 
lump sum if greater than or equal to 1 year. 
The Merritt Hawkins report for 2014 is a survey of physician salaries in the 
country. The survey includes 3,158 permanent and advance practitioner physicians that 
staffed hospitals within the 50 states during the 12 month period from April 2013 to 
March 2014.52 Base salary for 20 specialties was included in the report ranging from low, 
average and high as shown in Table 8. 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
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 Merritt Hawkins Medical Specialty Report Table 8.  
 
Adapted from Merritt Hawkins, “2014 Review of Physician and Advanced Practitioner 
Recruiting Incentives,” February 2016, http://www.merritthawkins.com/uploadedFiles/
MerrittHawkings/Surveys/mha2014incensurvey.pdf. 
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Since the organization encounters recruitment difficulties in the MC, a forecasting 
model is also used. A forecasting model that predicts some future difficulties is 
implemented. The NRM provided two types of data that included authorized billet and 
actual personnel billet between FY07 to FY15. The information can be used to forecasts 
future unfilled billets which may be critical to many opportunities for planning and 
decision making.  
2. Methodology 
Physicians bring into the labor force a unique set of abilities and skills. Such 
capital is an accumulation of years of education, experience and training that can be 
perceived as investments in human capital. The medical occupation then becomes a tool 
brought about by costs incurred in the near term due tuition fee, books and other school 
expenses. Eventually the benefits or economic returns are recouped in the long run by 
acquiring competitive salaries both in the civilian and military sector. 
a. Civilian and Military Pay Analysis 
The study for pay gap examines the effects on recruiting difficulties for Navy 
physicians at their decision point in all specialties. Military recruiting and retention are 
responsive to the level of military pay relative to civilian sector wage opportunities.53 
There are two main sources of RC in the MC which is the Career Transitioning Officer 
(CTO) and Direct Commission Officer (DCO). CTO are those military personnel who 
came from active duty but did not retire or are not receiving retirement pay. DCO are 
those who graduated from medical schools or actual physicians from the labor market 
who wishes to serve in the RC.  
The database used for the study compiled pay information from DFAS. The excel 
spreadsheet from the database has information about the base pay and BAS from FY-09 
to FY 16. Since the Merritt Hawkins survey reported salaries ranging from low, average 
and high across the nation, the database seen in Table 9 use a comparison base pay for O-
3 with greater than 3 years for low civilian physician. The average civilian physician 
                                                 
53 John Warner. The Effect of the Civilian Economy on Recruiting and Retention, 71. 
http://militarypay.defense.gov/Portals/107/Documents/Reports/SR05_Chapter_2.pdf. 
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comparison in the table is composed of O-5 with greater than 12 years of service and the 
high salaried civilian physician is compared to an O-6 with greater than 18 years in 
service. Those in the rank of O-7 and above was not included due to their executive 
medicine position in the military and therefore assumed that they do not have clinical 
work but purely administrative. 
Included in the database are incentive pay amounts from DFAS and 
OPNAVINST 7220.17. The amount of bonuses that was derived specifically includes 
ISP, VSP, ASP and BCP since according to instructions are available to the RC of the 
MC. Computation for such incentives varies on the database since ASP and ISP are given 
as a lump sum amount annually while the VSP and BSP are given monthly. Also, the 
amount given to the RC officer is dependent on the amount of time that a RC officer is 
activated to AC status. If the orders is greater than one year therefore all the incentives 
pay are given as a total amount. If the orders are less than a year only the BCP and VSP 
are given since the requirement for the other bonuses is an activation of greater than or 
equal to one year. 
Deployment is also factored in the database in the event that a RC is activated to 
deploy OCONUS in a hostile area such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the pay that is 
eligible for the MC in the RC includes family separation allowance, hostile fire pay, 
hazardous area pay and additional subsistence allowances.  
In terms of DCO analysis comparison with the civilian workforce, databases 
which includes sign on bonuses, monthly stipend while in training and loan repayment 
incentive where also added. Normally, if a physician elects to join the MC in the RC they 
are eligible to receive a sign on bonus amount that is approved for that certain year. Also, 
a monthly stipend of approximately $2K per month is given for some training needed for 
certain critical specialty in the reserves. The loan repayment program covers an amount 
not to exceed $50K when a Physician who incurred Medical School debt enters the 
Reserves. 
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 Civilian and Military Pay Gap Table Table 9.  
 
 
b. Scenario-Based Cost Comparison 
The majority of the analysis is approached with the use of Net Present Value 
(NPV) where discounted future returns are compared with discounted costs.54  
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If NPV is greater than zero over a period of time then the notion of investing on 
additional human capital is expected. Also, the investment model suggests that higher 
future earnings, productivity and job satisfaction is incorporated in the returns of an NPV 
with a greater than zero.55 As a factor in the formula for NPV, discount rate (r) states that 
the higher the preference for current consumption relative to the future the higher the (r) 
is. Opportunity costs are also taken into consideration in the analysis since the 
                                                 




Emergency Medicine 79,250$      132,634$    228,686$   
Family Medicine 28,250$      50,834$      129,286$   
General Surgery 109,250$    193,234$    302,686$   
Internal Medicine 36,250$      66,634$      149,686$   
Neurosurgery 427,147$    515,215$    645,022$   
OB/GYN 88,250$      133,834$    201,686$   
Orthopedic Surgery 200,250$    355,634$    565,686$   
Otolaryngology 148,250$    233,634$    352,686$   
Pediatrics 27,060$      49,772$      88,366$     
Psychiatry 53,250$      83,234$      143,686$   
Pulmonology 100,250$    191,834$    273,686$   
Urology 231,250$    306,034$    433,686$   
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comparison of wages between the military and civilian physician takes into account 
foregone earning when activated in the RC. 
The scenario based cost comparison is constructed into several scenarios of 
activation in the RC for a military physician. The first scenario used to make an analogy 
between military and civilian pay involves decision making points for a Family Medicine 
(FM) Physician. The analysis focuses on a FM physician who decides between serving in 
the RC or working solely in the civilian sector as a physician. The study conducted 
expands over a 5 year time period where the DCO elects to receive a sign on bonus and 
monthly allowance during 6 month required training. A maximum of $50K is also 
received during the entry to RC. The scenario includes the civilian sector annual pay for 
FM at a low rate since the member is a new graduate. Drill pay and 2 week training pay 
required per year for RC is also included in the analysis. The discount rate used is 10%.56 
The worst case scenario analysis used in the study incorporates situations that 
affect the recruitment for such an occupation in the military. An MC in the RC can be 
activated to replace active duty personnel within the continental U.S. (CONUS) duty 
station depending on the necessity for such a specialty. The big three hospitals in 
CONUS are located in California, Maryland and Virginia where capability that matches 
high end hospitals in the U.S. is comparable. Some specialties are scarce in the MC 
therefore in a worst case scenario setting where an RC officer is activated to AD for 3 
years is used as a comparison. Another scenario added to reflect deployments in hostile 
or hazardous area is also used in the analysis. Assuming that a member of the MC in the 
RC could be deployed to a major conflict area once per paygrade, the rank used in the 
analysis is O-4 with over 8 years of service to be compared with a low-level civilian 
physician, O-5 with greater than 12 years of service in the military for the average 
comparison, and O-6 with greater than 18 years of service for the high salary comparison. 
                                                 
56 John T.Warner and Saul Pleeter. “The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military Downsizing 
Programs.,” The American Economic Review 91(1): 33–53. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677897. 
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c. Forecasting Model 
The forecasting model formally interprets patterns in the data and expresses a 
statistical relationship between past and current values of the variable.57 Manpower and 
personnel data such as recruiting often shows unfilled authorized billets. The data 
provided by NRM showed this issue in a monthly snapshot between FY07 to FY15. The 
higher the anticipated unfilled billets are projected the need for more planning and 
strategizing to address such an issue must be performed.  
Time series analysis discovers a pattern from past data values that are 
extrapolated into future forecasts. According to Cengage learning, “Quantitative 
forecasting methods are used when past information about the variable being forecasted 
is available, the information can be quantified and it is reasonable to assume that the 
pattern of the past continues in the future.”58  
The model used in forecasting unfilled billets in the RC includes the 
autoregressive moving average (ARIMA models) and exponential smoothing models. 
The appropriate model is dependent on the behavior of the data being analyzed. Some of 
the behavior that is considered includes stationarity, trend, seasonal adjustment and 
correlation.  
In this analysis, we use JMP software package to forecast future unfilled billets in 
the MC at NRM. The final result being the solution with the best fit for the data are 
determined based on Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), distribution and pictorial 




                                                 
57 Jeffrey Hyink. “Manpower Model” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2015). 
58 “Time Series Analysis and Forecasting,” Cengage Learning, February 2016, 
http://www.cengage.com/resource_uploads/downloads/0840062389_347257.pdf. 
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V. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents the results of the cost analysis incorporating several 
scenarios for the RC in the MC. 
B. COST ANALYSIS  
The affiliation of physicians in the MC of the RC is directly affected by the salary 
offered in the civilian sector. In order to determine required policy changes in terms of 
incentives and bonuses offered for recruitment it is important to analyze different 
conditions that may affect recruits decision to affiliate. The cost used in the study is based 
on FY10 to FY15 data from DFAS and the Merritt Hawkins report of 2014. Military pay 
includes the base pay, BAS, BAH and special pays as outlined in OPNAVINST 7220.17 
while the civilian physician pay is based on the low, average, and high salary range for 
medical specialties in the U.S. 
1. Civilian Military Pay Gap 
The MC in the RC that chooses to be affiliated in the military is required to drill 
once a month and participate in two weeks training every year. The military instruction 
that governs their pay indicates that drill pay is to be based on the rank and years of 
service. Also, in terms of special pay and incentive, military RC physicians must be 
activated for at least one year or their special pay is pro-rated if activation is less than a 
year.  
The Merritt Hawkins report incorporated physician salary in a scale of low, 
average and high between years 2010 to 2014 within the fifty states. The low salary is 
compared to entry level military physician in the O-3 paygrade with at least 4 years of 
service. This comparison reflects a competitive analysis from a low salaried physician in 
an entry level after medical school. The analysis showed that the military doctor is 
activated for a year and is receiving ASP, ISP, BCP and VCP which makes them entitled 
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for the special pay per Navy instructions.59 The activation of the RC is assumed on this 
scenario to be not continuous but rather occurring in different years for a total of 5 years. 
The cost analysis showed that at a low level there has been an increase of 31% in the 
salary gap for physicians between the civilian and the military in a span of 4 years where 
the civilian sector pays higher than the military. Figure 12 results is based on the salary 
gap for military and civilian physician across 10 specialties which include Emergency 
Medicine (EM), Family Medicine (FM), General Surgeon (GS), Internal Medicine (IM), 
Obstetrics and Gynecology (OBGYN), Otolaryngology, Pediatrics, Psychiatry, 
Pulmonology and Urology. 
Figure 12.  Low Level and O-3 Pay Comparison 
 
 
The average level comparison for the report of salaries for civilian physicians is 
compared to an O-5 military with at least 12 years of service. This is highly comparable 
to civilian counterparts who are receiving an average physician salary. Using the same 
                                                 
59 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. Special Pay for Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Service 
Corps, and Nurse Corps Officers. OPNAVINST 7220.17. December 28, 2005. http://www.med.navy.mil/
bumed/Special_Pay/Documents/HomeLinks/References/OPNAVINST%207220.17.pdf. 
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specialties and by computing the gap between the salaries provided to the civilian 
physicians between 2010 and 2014, the analysis shows that there is a 12% increase in the 
salary gap. Figure 13 result is consistently showing that the civilian sector is receiving 
higher salary in all those specialties for the past 4 years. This outcome may be due to the 
steady increase of physician salaries as a result of the aging population and the need for 
steady increase in the supply of physicians according to the report of the USDHHS in 
2005. 
Figure 13.  Average Level and O-5 Pay Comparison 
 
 
The high-level comparison in Figure 14 shows the least amount of change in the 
gap at 5.3%. The comparison of the civilian sector was compared with a military officer 
at the rank of O-6 with greater than 18 years of service. The Merritt Hawkins report 
indicated that there is a slower increase in the salaries for 5 of the 10 specialties of 
civilian physicians. The increase in demand for physicians as the population becomes 
older showed a spike in the need for more recruits. Most of the increase was seen in the 
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low and average salaried physician since this is where the majority of the pool of assets is 
needed.60  
Figure 14.  High Level and O-6 Pay Comparison 
 
 
Overall, the civilian and military pay gap in the medical field has been growing in 
the last 4 years. Various factors may contribute to the constant increase in the salaries for 
civilian physicians. The rising health care cost is a big factor, the increasing aging 
population and emerging technological advancement.61 This may suggest that due to the 
increasing demand for healthcare, the field for physicians continues to be marketable and 
competitive especially in terms of wages 
                                                 
60 “Physician Supply and Demand: Projections to 2020.” U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, October 2006. http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/supplydemand/medicine/
physician2020projections.pdf.  
61 Ellen Lanser. Our Aging Population: Implications for Healthcare Organizations. Healthcare 
Executive18 (February 2003): 6–11. http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/8755371/our-aging-
population.  
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C. SCENARIO BASED COST COMPARISON 
The scenario based cost comparison is a tool to better understand the decision 
making process determines whether a potential recruit joins or affiliates with the MC in 
the RC. By understanding the different scenarios that an MC in the RC faces may show 
the difficulties in the recruitment effort of potential candidates. It may also become a 
selling mechanism to persuade civilian entry level physicians and medical school 
graduates to understand the advantage and disadvantage of joining the military service. 
The NPV’s discount rate is 10% since individuals tend to discount a larger amount of 
money with higher rates than those with lesser amount in terms of the sign on bonus. 
Military officers tend to have lower discount rates than enlisted personnel which are well 
above the range of 30 to 50%.62 
1. DCO vs. Civilian Physician 
The majority of the DCO in the military may come from medical school graduates 
or practicing physicians who already have the certification. The scenario that involves 
this cost analysis is designed for a DCO who joins the reserve with a Family Medicine 
specialty. There are several incentives associated with this type of recruitment which 
includes a sign on bonus of $20K and a monthly stipend of over $2K for each month of 
needed training. In the computation it is also included that the DCO receives a Navy O-3 
pay and is eligible to receive a maximum loan repayment amount of $50K for any 
remaining educational debt. In order to capture the value of investing in the present by 
joining the RC, the DCO is compared to a civilian physician in an entry or low level 
salary since it is assumed that the member is a new entrant. The result of the analysis in 
Figure 15 shows that by accepting a commission in the MC of the RC a DCO receives 
$219K more than the civilian counterpart in Year 5. Therefore, it is beneficial to join the 
military and receive compensation to pay for the education debt early in a physicians’ 
career. 
                                                 
62 John T.Warner and Saul Pleeter. “The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military Downsizing 
Programs,” The American Economic Review 91(1): 33–53. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677897. 
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Figure 15.  DCO vs. Civilian Physician (Five-Year Period) 
 
 
2. MTF CONUS Activation  
A worst case scenario is used as a method to compute NPV for an affiliate or 
recruit who joins the SELRES in the MC. The DCO has a rank of O-4 with at least 8 
years in service and the civilian comparison has a specialty in General Surgery. In this 
case, since the DCO is activated greater than 1 year all the incentives applicable for the 
RC are available. ASP, BCP, ISP and VCP are added in the computation for a span of 3 
years. Also the DCO receives compensation for his or her housing allowance. The low 
level salary for a General Surgeon in the civilian sector is $270K. The findings on the 
analysis in Figure 16 shows a discrepancy of almost $348K lost in the physicians’ salary 
if a worst case activation happens in his career as a member of the MC in the RC. 
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The analysis for the deployment scenario cost comparison analyzes a General 
Surgeon who deployed three times in his or her career. Therefore, a rank of O-4, O-5, and 
O-6 is used to represent the deployment frequency in each of the members’ rank. In this 
computation a series of extra pay such as FSA, Subsistence and hostile fire pay is added 
to the total income of the SELRES. Also, the assumption that the member is activated for 
more than a year is given in order for the special pay to be included in the study. The 
amount indicated for the BCP, ASP, ISP and VSP is variable which corresponds to the 
value applicable for the year and rank of deployment. The result of the analysis in Figure 
17 also proved that the civilian and military pay gap continues to negatively impact the 
decision of potential recruits. In this case the gap in a span of 3 years equates to almost 
$457K. 
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Figure 17.  Three Years’ Deployment At War Zone 
 
 
D. FORECAST RESULT 
Manpower and personnel data from BUMED shows unfilled billets for each of the 
last 96 months because of the difficulties in recruiting physicians faced by NRM. The 
number of MC Manpower authorized billets between FY07 and FY15 is approximately 
6,300 and the actual filled billets number approximately 4,500. In this section, we build a 









Figure 18.  Unfilled Billet Forecast (Actual and Predicted Unfilled 
Billet FY07 to FY16) 
 
Figure 19.  Data Autocorrelation Output from JMP 
 
 
The time series analysis from the monthly data of unfilled billet of MC in the RC 
is not stationary due to trend. The trend is evident in both the time plot (Figure 18) and 
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the Autocorrelation Function (Figure 19). Autocorrelation Function in Figure 19 shows 
statistically significant at lags 1 to 9 indicating that there is a trend in the data. We fit an 
ARIMA (1,1,1) with parameters shown in Figure 20. Analysis of the residuals shows 
constant variance, normal distribution and independence as shown in Appendix C. 
Figure 20.  ARIMA Model Parameters 
 
 
It is estimated that in FY16 an average of 253 billets will not be filled and 
suggests that the difficulties in the recruitment of MC in the RC will continue to be an 
issue for NRM in FY16. 
Figure 21.  Unfilled Billet Forecast (11 Month Period) 
 
 
The model predicts that the number of unfilled billets in the next 11 months of 
FY16 is likely to remain around 250 to 265 (see Figure 21). The problem of recruiting 
MC in the RC continues to persist over time based on the forecast model. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The civilian and military pay gap for physicians studied across 10 specialties, 
which included Emergency Medicine (EM), Family Medicine (FM), General Surgeon 
(GS), Internal Medicine (IM), Obstetrics and Gynecology (OBGYN), Otolaryngology, 
Pediatrics, Psychiatry, Pulmonology and Urology shows a discrepancy that may be 
unfavorable to a potential recruit to join the RC. A low level civilian physician 
comparable to an O-3 in the military showed a disparity of 31% which is the highest 
among the category of pay. The average level physician compared to an O-5 has a gap of 
12% and the high paying physician in the civilian sector compared to an O-6 has a gap of 
5.3%. The gap may then indicate why there is an existing problem or difficulty in the 
recruitment of professionals in this sector to join the reserves.  
The cost analysis for the different worst case scenarios showed interesting results; 
the decision making process always points out the worst cases compared to the normal 
scenario of drilling twice a month and training two weeks per year. The result for the 
DCO recruit who elects to receive loan repayment bonus showed a greater than $200K 
increase in income for a period of 5 years compared to a civilian entry-level physician. 
The MTF tour for 3 years and deployment for 3 different time horizons negatively 
impacted the potential income for physicians who would join the service with a General 
Surgery specialty. The negative income of $270K and $150K was computed based on 
NPV. 
The recruitment difficulties in the RC continue to persist in the coming years as 
shown in the forecast model. Therefore, a much more thorough planning and action 
toward achieving quotas to fill billets must be aggressively considered.  
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. SUMMARY 
The NRM has the lowest recruitment numbers for MC compared to the other 
military services.63 Although the number of MC Officer in the RC is constantly low, 
tremendous difficulty toward the recruitment effort in meeting accession goals continues 
to persist. The SELRES accession plan for MC in the RC tends to be at the low 100 
personnel with an upper band of mid-100 recruitment goals per FY.64 As the MC in the 
RC evolves to a more challenging role significant change is a must in terms of 
organizational structure. A more aggressive strategy needs to be in place to address such 
changes so that organizational structure aligns with the changes in the environment. The 
MC deploys to forward missions more frequently than before the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan therefore filling critical billets to supporting Navy Medicine missions. The 
competitiveness of civilian sector healthcare poses a challenge in the recruiting of 
physicians choosing military service. So the timely need for organizational change in the 
recruitment strategy is immediate. To address this dynamic environment the MC in the 
RC should re-align recruitment strategy across all levels in the organization. The use of 
cost analysis as a tool to improve competitiveness of benefits and incentives could make 
recruiting easier. Keeping the amount of pay and incentives offered to a highly 
specialized profession unchanged could contribute to the problem of filling billets in the 
MC of the RC. A trend analysis to predict future recruitment difficulties may support the 
MC in addressing such an undertaking. 
B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The difficulties of recruiting in the MC of the RC is analyzed using two methods: 
(1) an organizational diagnosis using a transformation tool; (2) a cost analysis using pay 
                                                 
63 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Defense Manpower 
Requirements Report Fiscal Year 2011–2015 (Washington, DC: Program and Budget Coordination Office, 
2015). 
64 James Clearwood, FY 10–15 SELRES Accession Plan, email discussion with author December 
2015. 
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gaps and scenario based cost comparison to pinpoint factors that may affect the decision 
of a physician to join the RC. 
This section discusses the findings for the research questions in the study. 
1. What Are the Underlying Causes of Recruiting Difficulties in the 
Navy RC in the Medical Corps?  
a. Conclusion  
The cause of recruitment difficulties facing NRM is derived from organizational 
structure and policies regarding pay for the MC in the RC. The changing role of the RC 
and the organizational goals must be congruent therefore a change is constantly needed to 
address such an issue in aligning mission with recruitment goals. Many types of military 
careers exist but that of the MC is complicated and unique. The competitiveness of the 
medical profession contributes heavily to this dilemma. Therefore, a more proactive 
approach in adjusting recruiting policies and procedures is important. 
b. Recommendation 
NRM must continue to include the subtle value of identifying various economic, 
societal and political factors as part of a strategy that affect both the internal and external 
MC organization is required. These factors maybe political, economic, or social that may 
provide signals on what accession programs to use for recruitment of MC. Medicine as a 
specialty that is of high value and demand in the civilian sector requires a more 
aggressive approach in terms of planning and strategizing for recruitment. NRM should 
continue to monitor the factors that may affect supply and demand of MC Officers. 
Another avenue to consider is the widening pay gap that has negatively impacted the 
appeal of military service. Policy changes that allow MC to receive incentives based on 
years in service rather than period of activation may improve recruitment in such a 
profession.  
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2. How Does Civilian and Military Pay Gap Affect Recruitment and 
Affiliation of MC in the NRM? 
a. Conclusion 
A cost analysis shows that there is an increasing salary gap between civilian 
physicians and military physicians. The effects on the recruitment are negative since the 
gap ranges from 5.3% to 30% across different medical specialties. The most promising 
source of recruitment based on the analysis is the NPV computation for a DCO compared 
to an entry level civilian physician. In a 5 year period, a DCO who elects to join the 
reserves and maximize incentives in the loan repayment program has a higher income of 
over $200K. The result gathered from the worst case scenarios of MTF tour and 
deployment shows a negative impact on the possibility of recruiting potential candidates. 
b. Recommendation 
NRM should focus on recruiting entry level physicians who needs educational 
loans. The cost analysis proved that they are more likely to generate more income if they 
elect to join the military service as a reservists compared to their civilian counterpart. 
This can be used as a mechanism to entice potential recruits to join the MC in the RC. 
3. What Organizational Theory and Design Can Realign NRM 
Personnel to Establish a Culture That Will Aid in Achieving Their 
Goals? 
a. Conclusion 
The Congruent model as a tool used for organizational transformation greatly 
helped identify the elements that may affect and contribute to the difficulties of 
recruitment. Alignment of organizational components such as work, people, structure and 
culture produces a tighter fit performance and solidarity in the entire organization. The 
transformation process using this model may unearth factors and trends that affect the 
organization as a whole. The identification of such factors helps change processes that are 
not applicable as the environment that affects the organization changes through time. 
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b. Recommendation 
NRM must develop a personnel strategy and culture for all levels of the 
organization to find the right person for the right job. This would create a ripple effect 
that may spread a positive outlook on the image of the organization and subsequently 
improve the recruiting environment . 
4. How Does Adjusting Special Pay Incentive Affect Affiliation? 
a. Conclusion 
An examination of the civilian and military physician pay gaps identified a 
disparity that may affect the decision of potential recruits. The civilian sector continues to 
increase salary for this specialty based on the demand as the population becomes older. 
Looking at the VSP, BCP, ISP and ASP alone in a span of 5 years in DFAS, the value did 
not change nor did it address the difficulties recruitment faces over the years. Since there 
is a tremendous study on cost analysis for such a gap it is about time to address the 
necessary steps to close the salary gap to improve the recruitment of MC in the RC. 
b. Recommendation 
BUMED should continue monitoring and adjusting special pay and other 
incentives to create a positive appeal for potential recruit to join the reserves. Ensure that 
the bonus and incentive amount available for military physicians in the RC is still 
competitive and relevant in comparison to the civilian sector. 
C. CONSIDERATION FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
NRM is an important part of Navy Medicine that needs further research on the 
difficulties faced in recruitment of MC. Understanding other aspects that negatively 
impacts recruitment may aid in the formulation of a strategy that can ease issues in filling 
critical MC billets in the RC. 
 Conduct a statistical analysis study using demographic information and 
other variables addressing specific factors associated with retention and 
affiliation to pinpoint trends that can be used to focus efforts on programs 
that produce positive results. An in depth look at this trend can shift 
budget allotment on recruitment effort that produce more recruits 
 67
compared to other programs. Also, those demographic trends can show 
certain characteristics of those who affiliate after active duty. 
 Conduct a survey for those who transition from CTO to SELRES to 
evaluate the value of incentives other than pay that may contribute to the 
decision of joining the RC. Understanding those other programs such as 
retirement, deployment and importance of medical practice can aid in 
constructing new steps that may positively impact the recruitment efforts 
for the NRM. 
 A study on the unique opportunity to practice medicine in the military as a 
factor that may entice potential applicants to join the service may show 
alternate recruitment strategy. The access to different types of medical 
subjects ranging from those encountered in the field to the highly 
technological MTFs may have a positive appeal in the taste of some 
potential applicants. Understanding intrinsic values that may weigh more 
than pay or incentives can provide an alternative pool of applicant that 
may join the MC in the RC. 
As more trends and factors are identified in future studies a better understanding 
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APPENDIX A. MILITARY SPECIAL PAY 
 Incentive Special Pay Table 10.  
 
 










Specialty 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Aer Med 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000
Anes 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000
Derma 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000
EM 26000 26000 26000 26000 26000 26000 26000
FP 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000
Gen Surg 29000 29000 29000 29000 29000 29000 29000
IM 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000
Neuro 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000
OBGYN 31000 31000 31000 31000 31000 31000 31000
Ortho 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000
Otolar 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000
Ped 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000
Psych 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000 20000
Pul/IM/CC 23000 23000 23000 23000 23000 23000 23000
Uro 28000 28000 28000 28000 28000 28000 28000
Opthal 28000 28000 28000 28000 28000 28000 28000
Rad 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000
Year 6 8 10 12 14 18 22
2016 416.66 1000 958.33 916.66 833.33 750 666.66
2015 416.66 1000 958.33 916.66 833.33 750 666.66
2014 416.66 1000 958.33 916.66 833.33 750 666.66
2013 416.66 1000 958.33 916.66 833.33 750 666.66
2012 416.66 1000 958.33 916.66 833.33 750 666.66
2011 416.66 1000 958.33 916.66 833.33 750 666.66
2010 416.66 1000 958.33 916.66 833.33 750 666.66
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 Board Certified Pay Table 12.  
 
Year 10 12 14 18 Above
2016 208.33 291.66 333.33 416.66 500
2015 208.33 291.66 333.33 416.66 500
2014 208.33 291.66 333.33 416.66 500
2013 208.33 291.66 333.33 416.66 500
2012 208.33 291.66 333.33 416.66 500
2011 208.33 291.66 333.33 416.66 500
2010 208.33 291.66 333.33 416.66 500
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APPENDIX B. CIVILIAN PAY 
 
  
Family Medicine Low Average High Psychiatry Low Average High
2013/14 $140,000 $199,000 $293,000 2013/14 $150,000 $217,000 $350,000
2012/13 $130,000 $185,000 $325,000 2012/13 $165,000 $218,000 $300,000
2011/12 $120,000 $189,000 $300,000 2011/12 $160,000 $224,000 $300,000
2010/11 $130,000 $178,000 $290,000 2010/11 $160,000 $220,000 $275,000
2009/10 $140,000 $175,000 $255,000 2009/10 $150,000 $209,000 $310,000
Internal Medicine Low Average High Pediatrics Low Average High
2013/14 $145,000 $198,000 $360,000 2013/14 $130,000 $188,000 $240,000
2012/13 $130,000 $208,000 $325,000 2012/13 $145,000 $179,000 $300,000
2011/12 $150,000 $203,000 $345,000 2011/12 $130,000 $189,000 $220,000
2010/11 $130,000 $205,000 $285,000 2010/11 $120,000 $183,000 $250,000
2009/10 $145,000 $191,000 $250,000 2009/1 $145,000 $180,000 $265,000
Emergency Medicine Low Average High OB/GYN Low Average High
2013/14 $220,000 $311,000 $400,000 2013/14 $215,000 $288,000 $380,000
2012/13 $210,000 $288,000 $450,000 2012/13 $225,000 $286,000 $350,000
2011/12 $170,000 $264,000 $380,000 2011/12 $180,000 $268,000 $440,000
2010/11 $160,000 $255,000 $380,000 2010/11 $220,000 $282,000 $360,000
2009/10 $185,000 $247,000 $380,000 2009/10 $175,000 $272,000 $350,000
Neurology Low Average High General Surgery Low Average High
2013/14 $180,000 $262,000 $400,000 2013/14 $270,000 $354,000 $515,000
2012/13 $180,000 $300,000 $400,000 2012/13 $240,000 $336,000 $550,000
2011/12 $160,000 $280,000 $420,000 2011/12 $220,000 $343,000 $450,000
2010/11 $160,000 $256,000 $345,000 2010/11 $205,000 $336,000 $450,000
2009/10 $180,000 $281,000 $460,000 2009/10 $175,000 $314,000 $410,000
Orthopedic Surgery Low Average High Gastroenterology Low Average High
2013/14 $350,000 $488,000 $700,000 2013/14 $240,000 $454,000 $560,000
2012/13 $250,000 $483,000 $750,000 2012/13 $291,000 $441,000 $600,000
2011/12 $400,000 $519,000 $750,000 2011/12 $300,000 $433,000 $550,000
2010/11 $300,000 $521,000 $700,000 2010/11 $300,000 $424,000 $505,000
2009/10 $300,000 $519,000 $825,000 2009/10 $300,000 $411,000 $600,000
Otolaryngology Low Average High Cardiology (non‐invasive) Low Average High
2013/14 $250,000 $372,000 $500,000 2013/14 $400,000 $442,000 $500,000
2012/13 $300,000 $398,000 $650,000 2012/13 $250,000 $447,000 $550,000
2011/12 $300,000 $412,000 $530,000 2011/12 $275,000 $396,000 $600,000
2010/11 $230,000 $359,000 $500,000 2010/11 $270,000 $420,000 $525,000
2009/10 $230,000 $349,000 $450,000 2009/10 $315,000 $420,000 $600,000
Cardiology (invasive) Low Average High Urology Low Average High
2013/14 $350,000 $454,000 $550,000 2013/14 $430,000 $504,000 $625,000
2012/13 $300,000 $461,000 $675,000 2012/13 $385,000 $424,000 $650,000
2011/12 $400,000 $512,000 $650,000 2011/12 $330,000 $461,000 $650,000
2010/11 $380,000 $532,000 $650,000 2010/11 $320,000 $453,000 $550,000
2009/10 $325,000 $495,000 $680,000 2009/10 $250,000 $400,000 $550,000
Neurosurgery Low Average High Pulmonology Low Average High
2013/14 $450,000 $591,000 $700,000 2013/14 $230,000 $358,000 $425,000
2012/13 N/A N/A N/A 2012/13 $225,000 $351,000 $500,000
2011/12 $450,000 $701,000 $1,000,000 2011/12 $180,000 $321,000 $415,000
2010/11 $550,000 $613,000 $700,000 2010/11 $200,000 $311,000 $430,000
2009/10 $590,000 $631,000 $720,000 2009/10 $200,000 $305,000 $430,000
Endocrinology Low Average High
2013/14 $175,000 $206,000 $235,000
2012/13 $170,000 $209,000 $300,000
2011/12 $180,000 $248,000 $380,000
2010/11 $180,000 $218,000 $270,000
2009/10 $200,000 $219,000 $270,000
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APPENDIX C. FORECAST MODEL 
 ACF and PACF Table 13.  
 
 
 ARIMA Normal Quantile Plot Table 14.  
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